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RESEARCHER LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE IN
HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH: INFORMED CONSENT
AND RESEARCHER MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
Roger L. Jansson, M.P.H., M.P.A.
Abstract: Two sets of federal regulations, the "Common Rule" and Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) regulations, govern human subject research that is either federally-
funded or involves FDA regulated products. These regulations require, inter alia, that: (1)
researchers obtain informed consent from human subjects, and (2) that an Institutional Review
Board (IRB) independently review and approve the research protocol. Although the federal
regulations do not provide an express cause of action against researchers, research subjects
should be able to bring informed consent and malpractice actions against researchers by
establishing a duty of care and standard of care. Researchers owe human subjects a duty of
care analogous to the special relationship between physicians and patients. The federal
regulations should provide the minimum standard of care for informed consent in human
subject research, and complying with them should be a partial defense. In contrast, expert
testimony should establish the standard of care for researcher malpractice, and IRB approval
should be a partial defense.
In 1993, the Kennedy Krieger Institute (KKI), a prestigious research
institute associated with Johns Hopkins University, initiated a two-year
research program in Baltimore to study the effectiveness of methods used
to reduce lead exposure in children.' The researchers measured the extent
to which the children's blood became contaminated with lead, and
compared those blood levels with the measurements of lead dust in the
children's homes over the same period of time.2 Two outraged parents
filed separate negligence actions when their children developed elevated
lead levels in their blood while participating in the research program
The parents alleged that they were not fully informed of the study's risks,
and that the researchers violated a duty to warn them when the children's
blood-lead levels became elevated.4
In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute,5 the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City granted KKI's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the researchers and institution had no legal duty to the
1. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 811-12, 820-21 (Md. 2001) (explaining
that the intervention consisted of five different levels of lead abatement achieved by removal of dust,
paint, or soil).
2. Id. at 812.
3. Id. at 825-29.
4. Id.
5. 782 A.2d 807, 832 (Md. 2001).
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plaintiffs. Both plaintiffs appealed, and Maryland's high court held that
there are several potential sources for a duty of care that researchers owe
to human subjects, and that the breach of such duties may result in
negligence.6 The Grimes court also held that a parent cannot consent to a
child's participation in nontherapeutic research that poses "any risk" to
the subject,7 a standard of care seemingly higher than that provided by
the federal regulations.8 The court later clarified that "any risk" means
"any articulable risk beyond the minimal kind... inherent in any
endeavor."9 It remains unclear whether this definition sets a higher
standard of care than the federal regulations, or merely interprets
allowable risk under the regulations."
The Grimes decision is part of a larger trend in which injured research
subjects have filed lawsuits against researchers." These high-profile
lawsuits have generated intense media attention. 2 This period of
increased legal and public scrutiny of the research enterprise will likely
lead to a dramatic rise in lawsuits by human subjects. However, few
cases have generated reported decisions; thus the case law interpreting
tort liability of researchers is scarce. Yet, in the near future many state
courts will be faced with the task of developing an approach for dealing
with negligence claims in human subject research.
6. Id. at 858.
7. Id.
8 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-409 (2001).
9. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 862.
10. See infra notes 162-63.
11. See Mary R. Anderlik & Nanette Elster, Lawsuits Against IRBs: Accountability or
Incongruity?, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 220 (2001); Complaint, Gelsinger v. Trustees of the Univ. of
Pa., Phila. County Court of Common Pleas (Sept. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.sskrplaw.com/links/healthcare2.html (alleging deficiencies in informed consent in a gene
therapy experiment) (last visited Jan. 3, 2003); Complaint, Robertson v. McGee, Northern District of
Oklahoma (Jan. 29, 2001) No. 01CV00GOH(M), available at
http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/robertson/coplaint-new.html (alleging negligence for failure to
follow the federal regulations in a study of a cancer vaccine) (last visited Jan. 3, 2003); Complaint,
Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr., Kitsap County Court, Washington (No. 01-2-
008376) (March 29, 2001), available at http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/wright/complaintl.htm (last
visited Jan. 3, 2003) (bringing class action regarding an experimental bone marrow transplant for
cancer).
12. See Michael D. Lemonick & Andrew Goldstein, At Your Own Risk, TIME, Apr. 22, 2002, at
46; S.G. Stolberg, The Biotech Death of Jesse Gelsinger, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Nov. 28, 1999, at
136; D. Wilson & D. Heath, The Blood Cancer Experiment, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at Al.
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When human subjects are harmed, the most likely source of liability
for researchers is based in negligence.'3 There are two initial
considerations when determining whether human research subjects can
bring negligence actions against researchers.14 First, is there a duty of
care owed to human research subjects? Second, if so, what is the
standard of care?
This Comment argues that state courts should recognize that
researchers owe human subjects a duty of care rooted in informed
consent and researcher malpractice. Part I describes the existing federal
regulations and the elements of negligence. Part II explores the special
relationship between a researcher and subject as a potential source for the
duty of care researchers owe to human subjects. Part III examines the
standard of care in negligence actions by research subjects for informed
consent and researcher malpractice. Part IV argues that researchers owe a
duty of care to human subjects, and that plaintiffs can establish a
standard of care in negligence actions against researchers for informed
consent and researcher malpractice actions. The federal regulations
governing human subject research provide the best standard of care for
informed consent, and complying with them should provide a partial
defense. Further, expert testimony under the medical malpractice model
provides the best standard of care for researcher malpractice, although
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval should provide a partial
defense.
I. HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH AND NEGLIGENCE
Two sets of federal regulations govern human subject research: the
Common Rule15 and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations.
The Common Rule applies to research funded by federal departments
13. Other potential sources of liability including battery, contract-related claims, fraud and
misrepresentation, strict liability in product liability cases, and constitutional claims are beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a discussion of other bases of liability, see Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Recovery for Nonconsensual Human Medical Experimentation, 2002 A.L.R. 5th 11 (2002). In
addition, many injuries to human subjects may simply be adverse events, which are also beyond the
scope of this Comment. For a discussion of other compensation systems for human subjects, see
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH INJURIES: THE ETHICAL & LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRAMS TO REDRESS INJURED SUBJECTS (1982).
14. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65
(5th ed. 1984).
15. The Common Rule is a set of federal regulations issued to protect human subjects. The
Common Rule is explained in detail at infra notes 31-51 and accompanying text.
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and agencies that conduct, support, and regulate human subjects
research. 6 In contrast, the FDA regulations apply to research involving
experimental drugs, biological products, and medical devices that are
subject to FDA approval.'7 In order for injured subjects to successfully
bring negligence actions against researchers, they must first prove that
the researcher owed a duty to the subject, and that the duty was
breached.'" The federal regulations governing human subject research do
not provide an express cause of action for negligence. Therefore, an
independent duty must exist at common law in order for researchers to be
held negligent.
A. The Common Rule and FDA Regulations
The federal regulations currently governing human subject research
are rooted in the international guidelines and codes that arose after
human subjects were abused in the Twentieth Century. 9 After World
War II and Nazi medical experiments, American judges developed the
Nuremberg Code, setting forth ten ethical principles that provided a
foundation for the protection of human subjects.2 ' Later, doctors and
scientists of the World Medical Association adopted the Declaration of
Helsinki and set international guidelines for biomedical research by
physicians.2' In 1966, the Public Health Service developed internal
policy guidelines requiring peer review of all research involving human
subjects.22
16. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2001).
17. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1, 56.101 (2001).
18. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 14, § 30 at 164-65.
19. See Leonard H. Glanz, The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on US. Statutes and
Regulations, in THE NAZi DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, 183-200 (George J. Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
20. The Nuremberg Code (1949), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK IN BIOETHICS 11-12 (Albert R.
Jonsen et al. eds., 1998).
21. World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Medical
Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (1964), reprinted in SOURCE BOOK IN
BIOETHICS 13-15 (Albert R. Jonsen et al. eds., 1998).
22. Surgeon General, Public Health Service to the Heads of the Institutions Conducting Research
with Public Health Service Grants, 8 February 1966 ("Clinical research and investigation involving
human beings") (ACHRE No. HHS-090794-A), reprinted in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION
EXPERIMENTS 100 (1996).
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By the mid-1970s, several highly publicized American research
abuses' led Congress to enact the National Research Act of 1974,24
which created the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research (National
Commission).2" In 1978, the National Commission published The
Belmont Report,26 setting forth three ethical principles 27-respect for
persons, beneficence, and justice-that later served as the foundation for
the federal regulations governing human subject research. Each principle
translated into a particular application to protect human subjects:
"respect for persons" translated into "informed consent," "beneficence"
into "risk-benefit assessment," and "justice" into "selection of
subjects." '2 The Belmont Report deliberately set a high standard of
disclosure for informed consent in the research setting, stating that "the
research subject, being in essence a volunteer, may wish to know
considerably more about risks gratuitously undertaken than do patients
who deliver themselves into the hands of a clinician for needed care. 29
The Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, known as
the Common Rule, is a set of federal regulations that incorporates the
ethical principles and guidelines of The Belmont Report.30 With minor
variations, it applies to all federal departments and agencies that conduct,
support, and regulate human subject research.3 The Common Rule was
developed under the Public Health Service Act's mandate "to protect the
23. See, e.g., Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354,
1354-60 (1966) (publicizing 22 examples of unethical research protocols); JAMES H. JONES, BAD
BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1993) (recounting the infamous study in which
hundreds of African-American men with syphilis were left untreated for decades to gain scientific
knowledge about progression of the disease).
24. National Research Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, § 102, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
25. Id. at § 203 (charging the National Commission with identifying the basic ethical principles
underlying all research involving human subjects and developing research guidelines from those
principles).
26. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Research, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Pub. L. No. (OS) 78-0012
(1978).
27. Id. at 4.
28. Id. at 4-20.
29. Id.
30. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-124 (2001).
31. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 22, at 425-38
(explaining minor variations of the Common Rule across federal departments and agencies).
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rights of human subjects of [biomedical and behavioral] research."32 The
regulation that formed the basis for the Common Rule was originally
adopted in 1981 by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(DHEW), a predecessor to the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS).33 In 1991, this regulation was adopted by other federal
departments and agencies as the Common Rule.34 The Common Rule
applies to federally-funded research on human subjects, and to research
conducted at institutions that have contractually agreed through a Federal
Wide Assurance (FWA) to apply the Common Rule to all research
regardless of the funding source.35 The HHS Office for Human Research
Protections (OHRP) enforces institutional compliance with the Common
Rule.36
The Common Rule places the responsibility of obtaining informed
consent directly on the researcher, and states that the researcher must
minimize the possibility of coercion and that the research must provide
the prospective subject with sufficient opportunity to consider whether to
participate in the study.37 The elements of consent include an explanation
of the purposes and procedures of the research, a description of any
reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits, and a disclosure of
alternatives.3 ' The consent process must also explain the confidentiality
policy, state that participation is voluntary, explain whether any
compensation is available if injury occurs, and provide information on
whom to contact with additional questions.39 The informed consent
32. Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et. seq., as amended by The Health Research
Extension Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-158 (Nov. 20, 1985).
33. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS, supra note 22, at 425.
34. Each department and agency has codified the Common Rule in different parts of the Code of
Federal Regulations. When citing the Common Rule, this Comment always refers to the Health and
Human Services (HHS) regulations at 45 C.F.R. § 46.101-24.
35. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (setting forth the assurance system, which requires all institutions
receiving federal funding to conduct research to provide formal assurance to Office for Human
Research Protections (OHRP) (or other applicable agency designee) that it will develop a system to
protect human subjects). In December 2000, OHRP developed a Federal Wide Assurance (FWA) to
streamline the assurance process. See http://ohrp.osophs.dhhs.gov/irbasur.htm (last visited Jan. 3,
2003).
36. OHRP, located in the office of the Secretary of Health and Human Services since June 2000,
was formerly known as the Office for the Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), which was
located in the National Institutes of Health (NIH). See 65 Fed. Reg. 37,136 (June 13, 2000). Even
though the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is part of HHS, the FDA (not OHRP) oversees
compliance with 21 C.F.R. sections 50 and 56. See 21 C.F.R. § 56.120-124.
37. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
38. Id. § 46.116(a).
39. Id.
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cannot include any exculpatory language that waives "any of the
subject's legal rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator,
the sponsor, the institution or its agents from liability for negligence."4
The Common Rule also sets forth circumstances where the requirements
for informed consent can be altered or waived.4' In addition, the
Common Rule states that these informed consent requirements do not
preempt any federal, state, or local laws which require additional
information to be disclosed for informed consent.42
The Common Rule also requires IRBs43 to independently review
research" protocols that involve human subjects,45 and sets forth the
requirements for the review of research46 and the criteria for its
approval.47 The IRB must review the informed consent form for
compliance with federal requirements,"g and must perform continuing
reviews at least once a year.49 The criteria for IRB approval of research
include a determination that: (1) the risks to subjects are minimized, (2)
the risks to subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, (3)
the selection of subjects is equitable, and (4) informed consent is sought
and documented.50 In addition, the Common Rule allows expedited
review for certain kinds of research involving minimal risk, and for
minor changes in approved research.5' Thus, the Common Rule places
the responsibility on IRBs to review and approve research protocols, and
40. Id. § 46.116; see also 21 C.F.R § 50.20 (2001) (prohibiting exculpatory agreements
concerning negligence in clinical investigations regulated by the FDA).
41. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(c)-(d) (listing circumstances where the IRB may allow the elements of
consent to be altered or waived).
42. Id. § 46.116(e).
43. Id. § 46.107 (requiring the IRB to include at least five members who possess the professional
competence necessary to review specific research activities, including at least one member who is
not affiliated with the institution).
44. Id. § 46.102(d) (."Research' means a systematic investigation, including research
development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge.").
45. Id. § 46.102(f) ('Human subject' means a living individual about whom an investigator
(whether professional or student) conducting research obtains (1) Data through intervention or
interaction with the individual, or (2) Identifiable private information.").
46. Id. § 46.109.
47. Id. § 46.111.
48. Id. §§ 46.109(b)-(c).
49. Id. § 46.109(e).
50. Id. § 46.111(a).
51. Id. § 46.110.
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merely requires researchers to obtain informed consent of subjects and
IRB approval.
The FDA developed a similar set of federal regulations in 1981 to
oversee research involving experimental drugs, biological products and
medical devices subject to FDA approval, even if it is privately funded. 2
The FDA regulations also require informed consent,53 IRB review and
approval. 4 The most notable difference between the FDA regulations
and the Common Rule is that the FDA regulations provide fewer
exceptions to the informed consent requirements, and fewer waivers."
Together, the Common Rule and the FDA regulations serve as guidelines
for human subject research.
B. Negligence Actions Against Researchers Generally
The Common Rule does not provide an express cause of action for
negligence. Instead, it merely states that violating the federal regulations
may result in a loss of federal funding and thus suspension or termination
of research. 6 The OHRP has recently increased enforcement and
temporarily suspended all human subject research at several prominent
institutions for violations of the federal regulations. 7
However, researchers may be liable to injured subjects for their
negligent actions.5 ' There may be a special relationship between the
researcher and human subject that imposes a duty.59 In order to prevail in
a negligence action against a researcher, an injured subject must prove
that: (1) a duty is owed by the defendant; (2) the duty was breached; (3)
52. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (2001). This Comment will use the term "Common Rule" to refer to 45
C.F.R. § 46 and the term "FDA regulations" to refer to 21 C.F.R. §§ 50 and 56. This Comment uses
the term "federal regulations" to encompass both.
53. 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20-50.27.
54. Id. §§ 56.103, 56.109, 56.111.
55. Compare 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(c)-(d) (2001) (Common Rule's provisions for modification or
waiver of consent requirements), with 21 C.F.R § 50.23 (2001) (FDA regulations' exceptions to
consent requirements). Certain types of research typically fall outside both regulations and are
beyond the scope of this Comment, such as surgery, dietary supplements and therapies, in-vitro
fertilization, and stem cell research.
56. See 45 C.F.R §§ 46.113, 46.123; see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.113 (FDA regulation on suspension
or termination of IRB approval).
57. Sharona Hoffman, Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, The Institutional Review
Board, and Continuing Review, 68 TENN. L. REV. 725, 727 (2001); see Anderlik & Elster, supra
note 11, at 223.
58. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001).
59. See infra Part l.B.
Vol. 78:229, 2003
Researcher Negligence in Human Subject Research
the breach caused injury to the subject; and (4) a cognizable injury.6"
Health care providers are subject to tort liability under two alternate
negligence actions: informed consent and medical malpractice." These
alternate causes of action correspond to two distinct interests of patients:
self-determination and competent care. 62 Thus, a jury's exoneration of a
physician from liability for medical malpractice does not forestall a
plaintiffs claim for failure to obtain informed consent 63 and vice versa.
Researcher liability may also be based on these alternate causes of
action, resulting in two distinct types of researcher negligence: informed
consent and researcher malpractice.
Physicians' obligation to obtain patients' informed consent before
providing medical treatment has become a general duty owed by
physicians to patients. 4 To establish negligence in medical informed
consent litigation, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the physician owed a
duty to disclose information to the patient; (2) the physician breached the
duty under the appropriate standard of disclosure; (3) the plaintiff was
injured; (4) the injury was the result of an undisclosed outcome or risk;
and (5) had the plaintiff been informed of the outcome or risk, the
plaintiff would not have consented.65 Before providing treatment, the
physician must obtain consent by disclosing and explaining all
information that is necessary for the patient's decision,66 which typically
includes the nature and purpose of the treatment, expected benefits,
foreseeable risks, reasonable alternatives, and foreseeable risks of
forgoing treatment.67 Lack of informed consent is generally treated as
professional negligence, and is based on a physician's professional duty
60. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 30 at 164-65. Proving causation and cognizable injury is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
61. See. e.g., Thomas v. Wilfac, Inc., 65 Wash. App. 255,261,828 P.2d 597,601 (1992).
62. See Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation:
Bridging the Gap Between Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 127-28
(1986).
63. See, e.g., Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 137 Wash. 2d 651, 653-54, 975 P.2d 950, 951-52
(1999).
64. See generally Nancy King, Consent and the Courts: The Emergence of the Legal Doctrine, in
A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 114-50 (Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp
eds., 1986).
65. Id. at 29.
66. See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1980) (en banc).
67. See generally John H. Derrick, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Liability for Failure of
Physician to Inform Patient of Alternative Modes of Diagnosis or Treatment, 38 A.L.R. 4th 900
(1985); W.M. Moldoff, Annotation, Malpractice: Physician's Duty to Inform Patient of Nature and
Hazards of Disease or Treatment, 79 A.L.R. 2d 1028 (1961).
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to provide patients with the appropriate information before they consent
to treatment.68 Courts considering informed consent actions against
researchers must determine how to establish the appropriate standard of
care for informed consent in human subject research.
Professional negligence, or malpractice, is a special type of negligence
in which professional standards of care have been developed for persons
possessing or claiming to possess special knowledge or skill.69 Medical
malpractice is the type of professional negligence most analogous to
researcher malpractice, and is generally defined as a failure to exercise
the required degree of care, skill and diligence ordinarily possessed by a
reasonable and prudent physician in the same medical specialty acting
under the same or similar circumstances.7" In medical malpractice, the
standard of care is usually derived from expert testimony by the medical
profession.7 Courts considering researcher malpractice actions must
determine how to establish the appropriate standard of care.
Because negligence actions against researchers have been rarely
reported, there are two important issues that remain unexplored. First, do
researchers owe a duty of care to human subjects? Second, if they do,
how can subjects establish standards of care to assess whether
researchers have breached that duty for informed consent and researcher
malpractice?
II. DUTY OF CARE
Courts have historically treated researcher negligence actions as part
of the medical malpractice framework.72 Recently courts have begun to
develop a specialized analysis for negligence causes of action in human
subject research.73 To bring a successful negligence claim against
researchers,74 a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant owed a
68. Faden & Beauchamp, supra note 64, at 29.
69. Id.
70. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 269 (2d ed. 2000).
71. Id. at 270; see Moringa v. Vue, 85 Wash. App. 822, 832, 935 P.2d 637, 642 (1997) (stating
that expert testimony is required unless evidence is observable by lay persons and describable
without medical training).
72. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
74. The liability of research institutions and IRB members is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For cases holding hospitals or institutions liable, see Gregg v. Kane, 1997 WL 570909, at *6 (E.D.
Pa. 1997) and Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E. 2d 1214, 1221 (I11. App. Ct. 1995). See also Friter v.
lolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111, 1114-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("[Flederal regulations specifically
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duty of care.75 Although many possible sources of this duty exist,7 6 this
Comment focuses on the special relationship between researchers and
subjects, and analogizes it to the special relationship between physicians
and patients.
A. Historical Treatment of Researcher Negligence Actions
Historically, courts have been reluctant to allow clinical research that
deviates from accepted medical practice. Courts have relied on the
medical malpractice framework to analyze negligence actions in human
subject research.77 Early experimental deviations from medical standards
of care were automatically considered malpractice, without regard to the
level of care used or the experimental nature of the treatment.78 Courts
did not accept clinical research as a necessary endeavor until the 193 OS. 79
Analyzing human subject research as a separate negligence cause of
action, apart from medical malpractice actions, is a relatively recent
development. Halushka v. University of Saskatchewan,0  a 1965
Canadian case, was one of the first North American decisions to
distinguish between medical practice and medical research. In the 1970s,
mandated that the hospital assume the duty of obtaining informed consent."). There is no precedent
for holding IRB members liable for negligence. However, there is split authority on whether state
peer review statutes designed to encourage peer review by providing physicians who serve on
committees with immunity for decisions to discipline their peers will protect IRB members from
liability. Compare Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 598 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding that an IRB
was not a peer review committee under the Minnesota peer review statute, and that the records were
not protected), with Doe v. Ill. Masonic Med. Ctr., 696 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (holding
that documents used by hospital IRB in the course of a medical study come within the scope of
privilege of the Illinois peer review statute). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-44.1 (Michie 2001)
(explicitly providing civil immunity to IRB members in Virginia).
75. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 164-65.
76. See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001) (stating that
potential sources for the duty the researchers owe to subjects include: the special relationship
between researcher and subject, the informed consent quasi-contract, an implied duty from the
federal regulations, and duties from international codes).
77. See, e.g., Brown v. Hughes, 30 P.2d 259, 262-63 (Colo. 1934).
78. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. N.Y. 488, 523-24, rev'd 50 N.Y. 696 (N.Y. Gen. Term
1871) (holding that an innovative treatment was negligent because it deviated from standard
practice).
79. See Fortner v. Koch, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (Mich. 1935) ("[w]e recognize the fact that, if the
general practice of medicine and surgery is to progress, there must be a certain amount of
experimentation carried on").
80. [1965] D.L.R.(2d) 436, 443-44 ("The duty imposed upon those engaged in medical research
to those who offer themselves as subjects for experimentation is at least as great as, if not greater
than, the duty owed by the ordinary physician or surgeon to his patient.").
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there was a transition period in which courts blurred the distinction
between causes of action based on traditional medical malpractice and
those based on research.8' The distinction between clinical practice and
research has also been a difficult and complex problem in regulatory and
ethical codes.8 2 Early discussions of research ethics and regulation often
distinguished between "therapeutic" and "nontherapeutic" research, 3
although many commentators have argued that this distinction is illogical
and confusing." The Common Rule abandoned this distinction, simply
referring to "research," but some courts continue to refer to
"nontherapeutic research" in their opinions.85
Recently, courts have begun to develop a specialized analysis for
negligence causes of action in human subject research. In 1986, a federal
district court in the Middle District of North Carolina became the first
American court to carefully address the duty of care and standard of care
for negligence actions based on informed consent under the Common
Rule. 6 In Whitlock v. Duke University,87 the court held that under the
Common Rule there is a heightened duty for disclosure of foreseeable
risks that differs from the medical context.88 The Whitlock court adopted
the Common Rule as the standard of care for informed consent in human
subject research,89 but it did not reach the question of whether a duty of
81. See Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimentation, 19 J.
LEGAL MED. 157, 198-202 (1998) (discussing the transition from medical malpractice to a distinct
cause of action in human subject research).
82. See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 3 (2d ed. 1986)
(defining "research" as "a class of activities designed to develop or contribute to generalizable
knowledge," whereas "practice of medicine" refers to "a class of activities designed solely to
enhance the well-being of an individual patient or client").
83. Id. at 8 (explaining that the original Declaration of Helsinki distinguished "nontherapeutic"
non-clinical research from "therapeutic" clinical research).
84. Id. at 8-10 (explaining that many types of research cannot be defined as therapeutic or
nontherapeutic, such as placebo-controlled, double-blind drug trials in which nobody knows who is
receiving placebo).
85. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001).
86. Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir.
1987).
87. 637 F. Supp. 1463 (M.D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987) (involving an
experienced diver in a simulated deep sea diving experiment to research high pressure nervous
syndrome).
88. Id. at 1471. In dicta, the court also considered standards of disclosure under the Nuremberg
Code and the Declaration of Helsinki. Id. at 1470-71.
89. See id. at 1471.
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care is implied by the Common Rule because it found that the Common
Rule's standard of care was not breached.90
In 2001, Maryland's high court held in Grimes that there are several
potential sources of duty that researchers owe to human subjects." These
include the special relationship between researcher and subject, the
informed consent quasi-contract, implied duties from the federal
regulations, and duties from international codes.92 Although the Grimes
court concluded that researchers may owe human subjects a duty of care,
it did not clearly articulate which of these sources the duty arises from.93
However, Grimes was the first case to explicitly state that "the very
nature of nontherapeutic scientific research on human subjects can, and
normally will, create a special relationship out of which duties arise."'94
B. A Source for the Duty of Care: The Special Relationship Between
Researchers and Subjects
Although there are a number of potential sources of duty that
researchers owe to human subjects, the special relationship between
researchers and human subjects offers the most likely choice. In general,
a person has no duty to aid someone unless he or she placed that person
in danger or had a "special relationship" with the person that created a
duty.95 A duty to aid or protect someone is typically found in
relationships involving dependence or mutual dependence. 96  The
relationship between a researcher and human subjects is analogous to the
special, fiduciary relationship between physicians and patients.97
90. Id. at 1475.
91. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 858.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 835-36.
95. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (describing four commonly recognized
special relationships in which an actor is under a duty to another: (1) common carrier-passenger; (2)
innkeeper-guest; (3) landowner-invitee; and (4) certain custodial relationships).
96. See id. cmt. b.
97. See, e.g., Angela R. Holder, Do Researchers and Subjects Have a Fiduciary Relationship?, 4
IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN RESEARCH 6-7 (1982).
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1. Physician-Patient Relationship
In many states, the existence of a special physician-patient
relationship is essential to negligence actions against physicians.98
Physicians have been regarded as fiduciaries99 of their patients and as
such are expected to act in their patients' best interests. 10' This fiduciary
duty arises out of the trust patients must place in a physician's skill,
learning, and experience.' Once the physician gains this trust, the
physician assumes the duty of informing patients of the nature and
hazards of their disease and treatment.
Courts have also viewed the special relationship between physicians
and patients as express or implied contracts. 0 2 Although a physician has
no duty to treat a patient until entering into a consensual transaction,
once the physician enters into this relationship the physician is obligated
to treat the patient at a certain standard of care. 3 Consequently, medical
malpractice law has included a mixture of contract and tort influences for
over a century."°
2. Researcher-Subject Relationship
If a medical researcher is also the subject's treating physician, courts
may view the dual physician/researcher-patient/subject relationship as
"special" under traditional principles of medical malpractice."0 5
However, it is less clear whether courts would view researchers who are
not a subject's treating physician as owing a special duty to the research
subject. Grimes was the first case to explicitly hold that the researcher-
subject relationship itself constitutes a "special relationship" similar to
98. See, e.g., Anderson v. Houser, 523 S.E.2d 342, 345 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (reasoning that
doctor-patient privity establishes the legal duty to conform to a standard of conduct and is essential
to medical malpractice claims).
99. See, e.g., Carson v. Fine, 123 Wash. 2d 206, 218, 867 P.2d 610, 617 (1994) (en banc)
(recognizing that the physician-patient relationship is a fiduciary one).
100. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that the doctor's
fiduciary duty of disclosure requires informed consent).
101. See, e.g., Moldoff, supra note 67, at § 1.
102. See FURROW, supra note 70, at 265.
103. See James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Physician-Patient Relationship
for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4th 132 § 2 (1982).
104. See Gary T. Schwartz, Medical Malpractice, Tort, Contract, and Managed Care, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REv. 885, 899 (1998).
105. Holder, supra note 97, at 6.
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that between a physician and patient."6 The Grimes court stated that "the
very nature of nontherapeutic research can, and normally will, create
special relationships out of which duties arise.' 10 7
Although the Grimes court did not cite any authority for holding that a
special relationship exists between researchers and subjects,
commentators have noted that there are several similarities between the
research-subject and physician-patient relationship.0 8  These
commentators have argued that the researcher-subject relationship is
fiduciary, because a researcher's specialized knowledge makes the
subject dependent on the researcher.0 9 Similar to the medical malpractice
context, the risk that researcher negligence could cause a subject bodily
injury might lead a court to impose special duties of care and disclosure
on the researcher.'
In addition, a researcher enters into a quasi-contractual relationship
with the subject by obtaining the subject's written informed consent."'
This quasi-contractual relationship might serve as the basis for a special
relationship similar to that of physician and patient. In Dahl v. Hem
Pharmaceuticals Corp.," 2 the Ninth Circuit held that a consent form in a
research protocol formed a unilateral contract."3 The Grimes court took
this contract analysis a step further and held that the informed consent
agreements in research protocols may constitute bilateral contracts that
create special relationships between researchers and subjects."' Thus,
there are significant similarities between the physician-patient and
researcher-subject relationship that may impose similar duties of care.
106. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001).
107. Id. at 835-36.
108. See Holder, supra note 97, at 6-7; see also Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 62, at 107-12
(arguing that the researcher has a fiduciary duty with the human subject, similar to that in the typical
physician-patient relationship).
109. See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 62, at 107-12.
110. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 846 (stating that recruitment of otherwise healthy subjects into
potentially hazardous study conditions for the purpose of creating statistics for testing scientific
hypotheses "would normally warrant or create such special relationships as a matter of law").
11. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (2001) (requiring a written" informed consent form unless the IRB
waives the requirement in exceptional circumstances).
112. 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993).
113. Id. at 1404-05 (allowing plaintiff to continue receiving the study drug even after the sponsor
had ended the study, based on a reliance argument in contract law).
114. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 843 (Md. 2001).
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III. STANDARD OF CARE
Once a plaintiff in a negligence action establishes that the defendant
owes the plaintiff a duty of care, the court must determine whether the
defendant met the standard of care." 5 Courts considering informed
consent and malpractice actions against researchers must determine the
standard of care that researchers owe subjects in each action. In both
informed consent and researcher malpractice actions, there are two
potential sources for the standard of care: federal regulations and expert
testimony.
A. Standard of Care for Informed Consent in Research
Physicians' obligation to obtain patients' informed consent before
providing medical treatment has become a general duty owed by
physicians to patients."6 The informed consent requirement in medicine
is based on a respect for the patient's autonomy and right to self-
determination." 7 As early as 1914, Justice Cardozo articulated this
principle in an oft-quoted opinion: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body... ."' In order to meet the standard of care for informed consent,
the physician must obtain, disclose, and explain all of the information
necessary for a patient to decide." 9 This typically includes discussing the
nature and purpose of the treatment, its expected benefits, foreseeable
risks, and reasonable alternatives, as well as the foreseeable risks of
forgoing treatment. 20 Courts faced with determining the standard of care
in researcher informed consent actions will most likely consider the
federal regulations and expert testimony. Typically, courts have adopted
the federal regulations as the standard of care for informed consent
actions against researchers' 2 ' and relied on expert testimony to determine
whether the standard of care was met.'22
115. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 164-65.
116. See generally King, supra note 64, at 114-50.
117. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
118. Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
119. See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 61 lP.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1980) (en banc).
120. See generally John H. Derrick, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Liability for Failure of
Physician to Inform Patient of Alternative Modes of Diagnosis or Treatment, 38 A.L.R. 4th 900
(1985); Moldoff, supra note 67.
121. See infra Part 11I.A.I.
122. See infra Part 11I.A.2.
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1. Using the Federal Regulations to Establish the Standard of Care in
Researcher Informed Consent Actions
Courts have held that a statute or administrative regulation can
provide the standard of care if a duty of care exists at common law.'23
Violations of federal statutes and regulations have served as the basis for
negligence actions in many areas of law. These include violating safety
standards for drugs, medical devices, and pesticides,'24 not complying
with environmental regulations on toxic waste,'25 and violating the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulations.'26 Courts can
adopt an administrative regulation as the standard of care if the
administrative regulation's purpose is: (1) to protect a class of persons
including the person whose interest was invaded, (2) to protect the
particular interest invaded, (3) to protect that interest against the kind of
harm which has resulted, and (4) to protect that interest against the
particular hazard from which the harm results.'27 In most jurisdictions, an
unexcused violation of a relevant federal statute or regulation constitutes
negligence per se as a matter of law.2 ' A minority of jurisdictions treat
violations of statutes or regulations as evidence of negligence, creating a
rebuttable presumption of negligence. 129
Although state courts are not required to adopt federal regulations as
the standard of care in tort litigation, commentators have argued that
state courts should give federal standards more weight. 3  As early as
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965).
124. See generally Paul Sherman, Use of Federal Statutes in Negligence Per Se Actions, 13
WHITTIER L. REV. 831 (1992).
125. See generally Sheila G. Bush, Can You Get There From Here?: Noncompliance with
Environmental Regulations as Negligence Per Se in Tort Cases, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 469 (1988/1989).
126. See John P. Ludington, Annotation, Violation of OSHA Regulation As Affecting Tort
Liability, 79 A.L.R. 3d 962 (1977).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
128. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Galey, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Idaho 1986) (reasoning that violation of
OSHA regulations constituted negligence per se); see also Steagall v. Dot Mfg. Corp., 446 S.W.2d
515, 518 (Tenn. 1969) (stating that violation of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act may result in
negligence per se).
129. Sherman, supra note 124, at 877-84 (comparing approaches to negligence per se in various
states).
130. See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products
Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2152 (2000) ("Although not formally obligated to adopt relevant
federal regulations as particularizing the standard of care in tort litigation, at least absent preemption,
courts should take them more seriously than they do at present."); see also Richard Ausness, The
Case for a "'Strong" Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 MD. L. REv. 1210, 1253-54 (1996)
Washington Law Review
1960, one commentator proposed that the standard of care for human
subject research should be at least partly based on applicable statutes and
regulations.' In 1997, a California court took the lead and held in Daum
v. SpineCare Medical Group'32 that the federal regulations designed to
protect human research subjects provided the standard of care for
informed consent in a negligence action against a researcher.'33 The
Daum court held that the human subject could successfully use the FDA
regulations to prove the elements of negligence per se. 134 Further, the
court held that the trial court should have instructed the jury on
negligence per se based on the defendant's violation of the federal
regulations on informed consent. 135 Thus, the Daum court derived the
standard of care for informed consent from the federal regulations, and
limited the role of expert testimony to whether the standard was met. 36
Several other courts have relied on the federal regulations to establish
the standard of care for informed consent in human subject research. The
federal district court in Whitlock held that the Common Rule established
the standard of care for an informed consent claim against researchers in
North Carolina, 137 and stated that there is a heightened standard of
disclosure of foreseeable risks in research than in the medical context.'38
Further, the Supreme Court of Washington adopted the Common Rule as
the standard of care for informed consent in Vodopest v. MacGregor,3 9
holding that University of Washington researchers violated the Common
Rule by requiring subjects to waive their legal rights to bring negligence
actions in the consent form, a requirement that violates the Common
(proposing a regulatory compliance defense but permitting plaintiffs to overcome it by producing
clear and convincing evidence that the regulation was inadequate).
131. Comment, Legal Implications of Psychological Research with Human Subjects, 1960 DUKE
L.J. 265, 271 (1960).
132. 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
133. Id. at 264 (involving spinal surgery using an experimental fixation device).
134. Id. at 273.
135. See id. at 279 ("Instead of being able to try the case based on the statutes and regulations
governing clinical trials, the Daums were forced to engage in a battle of experts over the duty of
disclosure.").
136. Id.
137. 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1475 (D.N.C. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the defendant did not violate the standard of care provided by the Common Rule, because the risk of
organic brain damage was not foreseeable); see supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
138. Id. at 1471.
139. 128 Wash. 2d 840, 913 P.2d 779 (1996) (involving research on the effects of high altitude on
subjects).
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Rule's informed consent provision. 4 ° Similarly, courts have held that the
FDA regulations set the standard of care for obtaining a patient's
informed consent before implanting experimental medical devices.'41
Thus, there appears to be an emerging trend among courts to use the
federal regulations as the standard of care for informed consent in human
subject research.
Defendants have argued that complying with federal safety standards
should shield them from state tort liability.'42 These defendants invoke
the federal preemption doctrine, arguing that the primacy of federal law
under the Supremacy Clause 43 overrides state tort law. Defendants have
successfully employed the preemption doctrine to overcome claims by
injured consumers involving federally regulated cigarette labels, medical
device labels and designs, and motor vehicle designs.'" In addition,
many defendants have argued that compliance with federal regulations
should be a complete defense to state tort liability.4 5 However, few
jurisdictions view regulatory compliance as a complete defense.'46 Most
states allow juries to take a defendant's compliance with federal
regulations into account, but instruct juries to treat federal safety
standards as only a minimum floor of acceptable conduct.'47 While state
courts have often been willing to treat violation of federal statutes or
regulations as negligence per se, they have been reluctant to treat
compliance as a complete defense.'48
Although no courts have explicitly addressed whether complying with
the federal requirements for informed consent is a complete defense in
researcher negligence actions, several courts have granted summary
judgment to defendants for compliance with the federal regulation
140. Id. at 857-62, 913 P.2d at 787-89.
141. See, e.g., Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 917 F. Supp. 624, 626 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Kus v.
Sherman Hosp., 644 NE.2d 1214, 1221 (111. App. Ct. 1995); Evraets v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc.,
34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852, 859-60 (Cal. App. 1994); Mitchell v. lolab Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877, 878-79
(E.D. La. 1988).
142. See Ausness, supra note 130, at 1225-37.
143. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
144. See Ausness, supra note 130, at 1225-37 (reviewing federal preemption of state product
liability claims).
145. See id. at 1239-47 (reviewing regulatory compliance as a defense).
146. Id.
147. See Paul Dueffert, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 175, 176, 186-88 (1989); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965)
("Compliance with a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation does not prevent a finding
of negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precautions.").
148. See Noah, supra note 130, at 2151-52.
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requirements for disclosure of risks.149 In Slater v. Optical Radiation
Corp.,"' Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
observed that when the risks are adequately explained to the research
subject, "he cannot complain that the risks materialized."'' Further,
Judge Posner cautioned that "[i]f experimental procedures are subject to
hindsight evaluation by juries, so that failed experiments threaten to
impose enormous tort liability on the experimenter, there will be fewer
experimental treatments, and patients will suffer."' 52 Thus, under Slater,
defendants could argue regulatory compliance as a defense.
However, complying with the federal requirements for informed
consent should not be viewed as a complete defense because the federal
regulations explicitly state that they do not affect state or local laws in
general.'53 Further, the federal regulations specifically state that the
informed consent requirements do not preempt any federal, state, or local
laws which require additional information to be disclosed for informed
consent. 54 Thus, states can set higher standards of care for informed
consent in human subject research without violating the federal
regulations. Several states have specific statutes or regulations
addressing human subject research that could provide a standard of care
for informed consent. 5 Although these laws usually adopt the identical
requirements as the Common Rule, some states have enacted statutes or
regulations providing additional protections to certain groups deemed
vulnerable when participating as human subjects, such as prisoners, the
mentally ill, and developmentally disabled persons.'56
149. See, e.g., Covey v. Surgidev. Corp., 815 F. Supp. 1089, 1095 (D. Ohio 1993); Beach v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 706 A.2d 26, 1998 WL 67744, at *2 (Del. Feb. 11 1998).
150. 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir. 1992).
151. Id. at 1333-34.
152. Id.
153. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(f) (2001).
154. Id. § 46.116(e).
155. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170-24175 (West 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 5173 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.85 (West 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:230.4 (West
2001); MO. ANN. STAT. § 630.115(8) (West 2001); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-04 (2002).
156. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3524 (West 2002) (protecting prisoners in biomedical and
behavioral research); D.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1305.09 (2002) (protecting mentally retarded persons in
experimental research); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1919[1] (West 2002) (protecting subjects in
mental health research); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-20-147 (2002) (protecting developmentally
disabled persons in experimental research) and 53-21-147 (2002) (protecting mentally ill persons in
experimental research). Some of these state statutes and regulations contain preemption clauses such
that they do not apply to federally-funded research that is already subject to federal regulations. See,
e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2445 (McKinney 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.20 (Michie
2001); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 388-04-010 (2002).
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At least two courts have imposed higher standards of care than those
in the federal regulations for informed consent in human subject research
without relying on state statutes or regulations governing human subject
research. The Supreme Court of California, in Moore v. Regents of the
University of California,'57 held that medical researchers must disclose
conflicts of interest under state law on informed consent,' even though
the federal regulations do not mention conflicts of interest. Further, the
Maryland high court in Grimes arguably set a higher standard of care
than the Common Rule for informed consent.'59 After holding that
researchers may owe duties to human subjects, the Grimes court further
held that parents cannot consent to their children's participation in
nontherapeutic research that involves "any articulable risk beyond the
minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any endeavor."'"6 The federal
regulations, however, allow research that poses greater than minimal
risks for children in certain situations.16" ' Thus, it is unclear whether this
ancillary holding established a higher standard of care for parental
consent in children's research,'62 or was merely an attempt to interpret
the level of risk allowed under the federal regulations.'63
In sum, there are few state statutes, regulations, or judicial decisions
that set higher standards of care for human subject research than those in
the federal regulations. Although the federal regulations allow states to
provide additional protections to human subjects, the trend at this point
appears to be for courts to adopt the federal regulations as the standard of
care for informed consent.
157. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
158. Id. at 485.
159. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001).
160. Id. at 862.
161. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.406-407 (2001).
162. See Lainie Friedman Ross, In Defense of the Hopkins Lead Abatement Studies, 30 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 50, 54 (2002) ("At trial, the legal and moral authority of parents to enroll their children in
certain types of nontherapeutic research should be reaffirmed.").
163. See Loretta M. Kopelman, Pediatric Research Regulations Under Legal Scrutiny: Grimes
Narrows Their Interpretation, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38, 47-48 (2002) (arguing that the court was
merely interpreting ambiguities in the federal regulations governing research); see also Robert M.
Nelson, Nontherapeutic Research, Minimal Risk, and the Kennedy Krieger Lead Abatement Study,
23 INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD: ETHICS & HUMAN RESEARCH 6, 7-11 (2001) (explaining that
the court merely affirmed the minimum risk standard in the federal regulations).
249
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2. Using Expert Testimony to Evaluate the Standard of Care for
Informed Consent
Even if the federal regulations provide the standard of care for
informed consent, expert testimony may be required to determine
whether researchers breached the standard of care. The federal
regulations require researchers to disclose certain elements of consent,
including an explanation of the purposes and procedures of the research,
a description of any reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits, and a
disclosure of alternatives."' Courts must develop tests to decide whether
researchers adequately met these federal requirements for disclosure.
Currently, there are two different tests for establishing the appropriate
standard of disclosure in medical informed consent actions: (1) the
professional practice standard; and (2) what the "reasonable person"
would want to know.'65 The professional practice standard, adopted in
over twenty-five states, 166 requires expert testimony to establish the scope
of a reasonable disclosure, based on what a reasonable practitioner would
have disclosed in a similar situation. 167 The "reasonable person"
standard, growing in popularity and approaching a majority position,' 61
bases the appropriate scope of disclosure on what a "reasonable person"
would want to know, regardless of professional practice. 69 The trier of
fact may determine what a "reasonable person" would want to know
without expert testimony, but expert testimony may still be needed to
clarify the nature of the treatment and its probability of risk.7 °
Thus, even if the federal regulations are used to establish the standard
of care for informed consent in human subject research, expert witnesses
will most likely be required to help factfinders determine whether the
researcher complied with the standard of care. For instance, in Stewart v.
Cleveland Clinic Foundation,7 1 expert testimony was used to determine
whether the standard of care set by the federal regulations was met. 72
The defendant argued that the informed consent for a clinical trial
164. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a); see supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
165. See King, supra note 64, at 30-34 (also noting that a third "subjective" standard has been
proposed in legal commentary, based on what the particular patient wants to know).
166. See FURROW, supra note 70, at 318.
167. Id. at 318.
168. Id. at 318-19.
169. Id. at 319.
170. Id.
171. 736 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
172. Id. at 501.
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complied with the Common Rule,'73 while the plaintiff provided a
contradictory expert report.'74 The Stewart court held that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to whether the informed consent form
complied with the federal requirements, and allowed the jury to decide.'75
In sum, courts have generally adopted the federal regulations as the
standard of care for informed consent, and have used expert testimony to
determine whether the standard was breached.
B. Standard of Care for Researcher Malpractice
Medical malpractice is the type of professional negligence most
analogous to researcher malpractice, and is generally defined as a failure
to exercise the required degree of care, skill and diligence ordinarily
possessed by a reasonable and prudent physician in the same medical
specialty acting under the same or similar circumstances.'76 The liability
of health care providers for medical malpractice is governed by (1) state
statutes and (2) expert testimony under medical malpractice law that
varies from state to state.'77 Although courts could determine the
standard of care for researcher malpractice actions by using the federal
regulations, no court has taken this approach because the federal
regulations only impose general requirements on conducting research. At
least one court has relied on expert testimony to establish the standard of
care in researcher malpractice actions. 1
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1. Using the Federal Regulations to Establish the Standard of Care
for Researcher Malpractice
No courts have used the federal regulations to establish the standard of
care for researcher malpractice outside the context of informed consent
claims. Although the federal regulations are intended to protect the rights
and safety of human subjects, 79 they do not impose specific
requirements on researchers beyond obtaining the subjects' informed
173. Id. at 495.
174. Id. at 497.
175. Id. at 501.
176. See FURROW, supra note 70, at 269.
177. Id.
178. Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48, 70 (1st Cir. 2002).
179. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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consent 8' and IRB approval.'8 ' The federal regulations place the
responsibility of weighing risks and approving research on IRBs, not on
researchers. 8 2 Thus, unlike in informed consent, the federal regulations
do not provide a specific standard of care for researcher malpractice
actions.
However, it is possible that IRB approval could provide a partial
defense in researcher malpractice claims, even though no courts have
explicitly addressed this issue. IRB approval requires that an independent
group of IRB members with professional competence determine, inter
alia, that the research had scientific merit, risks were minimized, and the
benefits outweighed the risks."8 3 Obtaining IRB review may therefore
provide evidence of due care in researcher malpractice actions. But, it
should be noted that the Grimes court allowed a negligence action
against the researchers to proceed even though the researchers had
obtained IRB approval.8 4 Indeed, the Grimes court accused the IRB of
abdicating its responsibility by helping the researchers to "miscast the
characteristics of the study' ' 85 and by "aid[ing] researchers in getting
around federal regulations."'' 8 6 Thus, not all courts have found IRB
approval to be a partial defense to researcher malpractice actions.
2. Using Expert Testimony to Establish the Standard of Care for
Researcher Malpractice
Most negligence actions against researchers to date have been based
on informed consent claims 87 rather than researcher malpractice, so there
is little case law to determine the standard of care for researcher
malpractice. Consequently, most commentators have focused on
informed consent issues in human subject research,' 88 and have ignored
or rejected researcher malpractice actions based on expert testimony. 89
180. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2001).
181. 1d. § 46.111.
182. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
184. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001); see supra notes 1-8
and accompanying text.
185. Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813.
186. Id. at 814.
187. See supra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
188. See Morin, supra note 81; see also Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 62.
189. See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehiman, How Will We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 671, 705-06 (1999). But see Edward Marshall, Medical Malpractice in the New
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Nevertheless, expert testimony could be used to establish the standard of
care for a reasonable researcher in the same research specialty acting
under the same or similar circumstances, similar to the medical
malpractice model. 90
In the medical malpractice model, the standard of care is usually
derived from expert testimony by members of the medical profession. 9'
The appropriate standard of care arises out of the complex interactions of
professional leaders, journals, peer discussions and meetings.'92 Thus,
standards of care emerge gradually through the interplay of numerous
comments from various professional sources once a practice becomes
generally accepted.'93 Once the standard of care is established by expert
testimony, courts merely enforce the standard in tort suits rather than
determining what the standard "should" be. 94 To prove medical
malpractice, the plaintiff must normally show that the defendant health
care provider violated the standard of care through expert testimony.
95
Very few cases have allowed patients to recover when the defendant
health care provider complied with the standard of practice. 96 Thus,
Eugenics: Relying on Innovative Tort Doctrine To Provide Relief When Gene Therapy Fails, 35 GA.
L. REV. 1277, 1303-08 (2001) (arguing that the medical malpractice model should be used to
establish the standard of care for gene therapy research, similar to how it has been used to establish
standards of care for innovative medical treatments that lack customary standards of care).
190. See FURROW, supra note 70, at 269.
191. Id. at 270.
192. Id. at 271-76.
193. In determining the standard of care for medical specialists, most jurisdictions have moved
from a locality rule to a national standard. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to
Patient By Medical Specialist as Determined by Local, "Like Community, " State, National, or Other
Standards, 18 A.L.R. 4th 603 §3 (1982) (listing cases that recognize that a specialist has the duty to
possess and exercise that degree of skill and care ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances,
by the members of his specialty in good standing, located in the same locality or community) and 18
A.L.R. 4th 603 § 6 (listing medical malpractice cases in which courts adopt standards of care based
on national or nongeographic standards of similar specialists). The standard of care for general
practitioners, interns, and residents is usually still based on the local or similar community standard.
See, e.g., Bahr v. Harper-Grace Hosps., 497 N.W.2d 526 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
194. See, e.g., Osborn v. Irwin Mem'l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(stating that "professional prudence is defined by actual or accepted practice within a profession,
rather than theories about what 'should' have been done").
195. But see Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 521-22, 519 P.2d 981, 985 (1974) (determining
ophthalmologist negligent as a matter of law even though he complied with the standards of the
profession) (later legislatively overruled by WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (1988)).
196. See JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 180 (9th ed. 1994).
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conforming with customary practice is generally a conclusive defense for
a health care professional.
9 7
Recently in Heinrich v. Sweet,19" the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit adapted the medical malpractice framework to human subject
research. 9 9 The First Circuit vacated a jury verdict for the plaintiffs on
the negligence claim and reversed in favor of the defendants, noting that
evidence that the physician had breached the standard of care was
flawed."0 The Heinrich court relied on expert testimony to determine the
standard of care in researcher malpractice, and held that the plaintiffs'
expert testimony lacked adequate foundation to show that the research
violated the standard of care at the time it was performed, in 1960-61.20o
Although the research predated the modem federal regulations, the
Heinrich court noted that the research received three levels of review by
administrative committees at the hospital, and that "approval by these
various committees is very compelling evidence" that the trials complied
with the standard of care. 0 2 In addition, the Heinrich court observed that
adequate informed consent is a partial defense to researcher malpractice
claims, but admitted that there are situations in which deviating from the
research protocol described in informed consent could lead to
independent negligence.2 3 Thus, the Heinrich court adapted the medical
malpractice model to establish the standard of care in researcher
malpractice.
In sum, although there is a trend for courts to adopt the federal
regulations as the standard of care for informed consent actions against
197. Although the medical profession is in the unusual position of setting its own legal standards
of conduct, merely by adopting its own medical practices as the standard, this privilege is based in
part on the reasoning that physicians set those standards with "primary regard to protection of the
public rather than to such considerations as increased profitability." See Rossell v. Volkswagen of
Am., 709 P.2d 517, 522, 523 (Ariz. 1985); see also Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528, 536-37 (1976). But see Philip G. Peters, The Quiet
Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millenium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163,
170 (2000) (observing that judicial deference to physician customs is gradually eroding, with twelve
states expressly rejecting deference to physician customs and another nine adopting a standard of
care based on the reasonable physician).
198. 308 F.3d 48 (1 st Cir. 2002).
199. Id. at 52-53 (explaining that the medical malpractice case was brought in 1995 for the deaths
of two patients given an experimental treatment for brain cancer over four decades ago, in medical
trials only recently made public).
200. Id. at 70-71.
201. Id. at 65-67.
202. Id. at 69.
203. Id. at 70.
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researchers, limiting the scope of expert testimony to determining
whether the federally-established standard was breached, no courts have
adopted the federal regulations as the standard of care for researcher
malpractice. Rather, courts such as the First Circuit in Heinrich have
used expert testimony to establish the standard of care in researcher
malpractice actions and viewed RB approval as a partial defense.
IV. INJURED RESEARCH SUBJECTS SHOULD BE ABLE TO
BRING INFORMED CONSENT AND RESEARCHER
MALPRACTICE ACTIONS AGAINST RESEARCHERS
An injured research subject should be able to successfully bring a
negligence action against a researcher by establishing that the researcher
owes the subject a duty of care based on the special relationship between
a researcher and subject. Once the injured research subject has
demonstrated that a duty of care exists, courts must determine whether
the researcher has violated the standard of care. A plaintiff should be
able to establish that the federal regulations are the standard of care for
informed consent in human subject research, using expert testimony to
determine if the federal requirements for informed consent have been
met. Violating the federal requirements for informed consent should
result in a finding of negligence, and compliance with the federal
regulations should provide a partial defense. Further, a plaintiff should be
able to establish the standard of care for other researcher malpractice
actions by using expert testimony, similar to the medical malpractice
model. Failure to obtain IRB approval before proceeding with human
subject research protocols should result in a finding of negligence, and
IRB approval should provide a partial defense.
A. Establishing the Duty of Care For Human Subject Research
A plaintiff who participates in a research study should be able to
establish a duty of care against researchers. Although the duty arising
from the researcher-subject relationship has rarely been addressed by the
courts, plaintiffs should be able to successfully establish that researchers
owe a duty of care to human subjects that resembles the special
physician-patient relationship.2" Grimes is the first case to explicitly
hold that researchers owe duties to human subjects based on special
204. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
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relationships. 25 The Grimes court stated that "the very nature of
nontherapeutic scientific research on human subjects can, and normally
will, create special relationships out of which duties arise,"2 6 and noted
that no laws preclude "the parties to a scientific study" from entering into
"special relationships with the subjects of the study that can create
duties. 20 7 Plaintiffs should be able to rely on Grimes as persuasive
authority that the special relationship between researchers and subjects
exists even outside of Maryland.
Further, plaintiffs should be able to establish that researchers owe
subjects a duty of care by emphasizing the similarities between the
researcher-subject relationship and the physician-patient relationship.2 8
Plaintiffs should argue first that negligence in human subject research
may result in bodily injury,09 creating a duty similar to that imposed in
medical malpractice. Second, the researcher-subject relationship is
fiduciary in nature because the subject is dependent on the researcher's
specialized knowledge.2 " Third, the researcher-subject relationship is
initiated by an informed consent quasi-contract, 21' similar to the patient-
physician relationship.2 2 Drawing on these similarities, injured research
subjects should be able to successfully establish that researchers owe an
affirmative duty of care to human subjects based on the special
relationship that exists between researchers and subjects.
Although it can be argued that the researcher-subject relationship is
distinguishable from the physician-patient relationship because
researchers can potentially have little to no personal interaction with
human subjects, the researcher-subject relationship arguably imposes a
higher duty of care. Research often involves unforeseeable and unknown
risks, increasing the subject's dependence on the researcher's specialized
knowledge. 23 There is often less accepted scientific evidence and
experience to establish what is safe in human subject research than in
205. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001).
206. Id. at 834-35.
207. Id.
208. See supra Part lI.B.
209. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 846 (stating that recruitment of otherwise healthy subjects into
potentially hazardous study conditions for the purpose of testing scientific hypotheses "would
normally warrant or create such special relationships as a matter of law").
210. See Holder, supra note 97, at 6-7; Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 62, at 107-12.
211. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
213. See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 62, at 69.
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medical practice.214 Further, the research subject often has less chance of
receiving a direct benefit than medical patients, and is often acting out of
altruism rather than self-interest."'5 Whereas physicians are primarily
attempting to help patients,216 researchers and subjects may have
conflicting interests.21 7 Indeed, the federal requirements for written
informed consent218 prior to research have been held to be more stringent
than the unwritten consent implied in the physician-patient relationship,
and to create a higher standard of disclosure of foreseeable risks.2"9 Thus,
courts should find that researchers owe a duty of care to their subjects.
B. Establishing the Standard of Care for Human Subject Research
Plaintiffs should be able to bring two types of professional negligence
actions against researchers: informed consent, and researcher
malpractice. The federal regulations governing human subject research
should provide the minimum standard of care for informed consent.
Violating the federal requirements for informed consent should result be
deemed negligence, and researchers' compliance with them should be a
partial defense. In contrast, plaintiffs should be able to establish a
standard of care for researcher malpractice actions through expert
testimony, and researchers who obtain IRB approval should be allowed a
partial defense.
1. Establishing the Standard of Care for Informed Consent in
Research
A standard of care may be established by administrative regulations,220
and violation of federal regulations has served as the basis for negligence
actions in many areas of law.22' Courts may adopt the standard of care
from federal regulations that protect: (1) a class of persons whose interest
is invaded, (2) the particular interest that is invaded, (3) against the harm
214. See id.
215. Id.; see National Commission, supra note 26 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Rossell v. Volkswagen of Am., 709 P.2d 517, 522-23 (Ariz. 1985); see also supra
note 197.
217. See Morin, supra note 81, at 213; see also Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 62, at 69.
218. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2001) (requiring a written consent form for research).
219. Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1471 (D.N.C. 1986); see supra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text.
220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965).
221. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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which has resulted, and (4) against the particular hazard from which the
harm results.222 The Daum court held that the federal regulations provide
the standard of care for informed consent in human subject research
because they meet these four elements of negligence per se.223 In
particular, the Daum court found that the federal regulations are
"intended to protect the rights and safety of subjects '224 and that human
subjects are "within the class of persons for whose protection the [federal
regulations] were enacted. 225
Several courts have used the federal regulations to determine the
standard of care for informed consent in human subject research. The
Whitlock court adopted the Common Rule as the standard of care for
informed consent, and held that there is a heightened standard of
disclosure for informed consent in the research context.226 Similarly, the
Daum court held that violations of the federal regulation's requirements
for informed consent result in negligence per se, and limited the role of
expert testimony to whether the federal standard was met.227 Courts have
found that the federal regulations provide detailed, clear guidelines for
courts and juries to assess whether a subject's informed consent
conformed to the higher standard of care owed by researchers.22
In addition, other courts have relied on the FDA regulations to set the
standard of care for obtaining a patient's informed consent before
implanting experimental medical devices. 229  In Vodopest v.
MacGregor,23° the Supreme Court of Washington held that researchers
violated the Common Rule by requiring subjects to waive their legal
rights to bring negligence actions in the consent form,231 because the
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
223. Daum v. SpineCare Med. Group, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 260, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
224. Id. at 273.
225. Id.
226. Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1471 (D.N.C. 1986); see also supra notes 87-
90 and accompanying text.
227. Daum, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 273; see supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., United States v. Najarian, 915 F. Supp. 1460, 1473 n.21 (D. Minn. 1996)
(observing that "the requisites of 'informed consent' are detailed in the FDA's Regulations" and
holding, inter alia, that 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.20-50.27 is not void for vagueness).
229. See, e.g., Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 917 F. Supp. 624, 626 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Kus v.
Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (I1. App. Ct. 1995); Evraets v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc.,
34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852 (Cal. App. 1994); Mitchell v. lolab Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877, 878-79 (E.D. La.
1988).
230. 128 Wash. 2d 840, 913 P.2d 779 (1996).
231. Id. at 857-62, 913 P.2d at 787-89.
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Common Rule prohibits such exculpatory agreements.232 Courts have
thus recognized that both the Common Rule and FDA regulations
provide a workable standard of care by which to measure a research
subject's informed consent.
Even though the federal regulations provide a detailed standard of care
for informed consent, expert testimony will most likely be necessary to
determine whether a particular researcher complied with the standard of
care. The Common Rule sets forth specific elements of informed
consent, including explaining the purposes and procedures of the
research, describing the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits, and
disclosing the alternatives."' Courts currently apply two different tests
for establishing the appropriate scope of disclosure in informed consent
actions: (1) the professional practice standard; and (2) what the
"reasonable person" would want to know.234 Jurisdictions using the
professional practice standard should rely on expert testimony to
determine the scope of disclosure for each of the elements of informed
consent, based on what a reasonable researcher would have disclosed in a
similar situation.235 Jurisdictions using the "reasonable person" standard
should allow the trier of fact to determine the scope of disclosure for
each of the elements of informed consent that a "reasonable person"
would want to know, but should use expert testimony to clarify the
purposes, procedures, and foreseeable risks of the research. 6 For
instance, in Stewart v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation,237 the defendant
clinic argued that the informed consent form for a clinical trial complied
with the Common Rule,238 while the plaintiff provided contradictory
expert testimony.239 The court held that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the informed consent complied with the federal
requirements, and allowed the jury to consider expert testimony in
determining whether the researchers complied with the federal
regulations.24 ° Similarly, the Daum court limited the use of expert
232. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
233. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a); see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
234. See King, supra note 65, at 29.
235. See FURROW, supra note 70, at 318.
236. Id. at 319.
237. 736 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
238. Id. at 495.
239. Id. at 497.
240. Id. at 501.
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testimony to determine whether the standard of care provided by the
federal regulations was met.24'
However, complying with the federal regulations' informed consent
requirements should only be a partial defense for researchers. Although
several courts have granted summary judgment to defendants for
complying with the federal requirements for disclosure of risks,242 there
are several reasons why such compliance should not be a complete
defense. First, expert testimony will usually be required to determine
whether the informed consent was adequate under the federal
regulations, thereby precluding summary judgment.243 Second, the
federal regulations explicitly state that the informed consent
requirements do not preempt applicable federal, state, or local laws that
require additional information to be disclosed.2" Thus, courts must
consider whether state laws set higher standards for informed consent
and whether the researcher's actions violated them. For example, the
Supreme Court of California held that researchers must disclose conflicts
of interest under state law, even though the Common Rule does not
require it.245 Assuming that state or local laws do not require higher
standards for informed consent, plaintiffs should be able to establish the
Common Rule as the standard of care for informed consent in human
subject research. Violating the federal requirements should result in a
finding of negligence, and compliance should only be a partial defense.
2. Establishing the Standard of Care for Researcher Malpractice
The federal regulations require researchers to obtain IRB review
246
and approval 247 before obtaining informed consent and conducting
research on human subjects. The federal regulations do not, however,
provide a specific standard of care for the conduct of research. The
criteria for IRB approval generally requires that the IRB determine, inter
alia, that "risks to subjects are minimized ' 24 and "reasonable in relation
241. Daum v. SpineCare Med. Group, 61 Cal. Rptr 2d 260, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
242. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
244. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(e) (2001).
245. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,485 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936
(1991).
246. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2001).
247. Id. § 46.111.
248. Id. § 46.111(a)(1).
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to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects and the importance of the
knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result." '249 The IRB also
must make technical decisions about the scientific merit of research
protocols before approving the research. ° Thus, the federal regulations
place the primary responsibility of risk-benefit analysis and approval of
research on IRBs, and do not provide detailed standards of care for the
actual conduct of research in researcher malpractice. However, obtaining
IRB approval could become part of the standard of care for researcher
malpractice, in which case conducting research without RB approval
could result in researcher malpractice.
Setting the federal regulations aside, plaintiffs should be able to
successfully establish the standard of care in researcher malpractice
actions through expert testimony, similar to the medical malpractice
model. The standard of care in medical malpractice is generally
established by expert testimony, and is defined as a failure to exercise the
required degree of care, skill, and diligence ordinarily possessed by a
reasonable and prudent physician in the same medical specialty acting
under the same or similar circumstances. 25' Early cases treated research
that deviated from medical standards of care as negligent, without
developing a specialized standard of care for research. 2 Courts should
adapt the medical malpractice model to establish a specialized standard
of care in researcher malpractice actions, using expert testimony to
determine the degree of care, skill and diligence ordinarily possessed by
a reasonable and prudent researcher in the same research specialty acting
under the same or similar circumstances. The First Circuit adopted this
approach in Heinrich using expert testimony to establish the standard of
care for researcher malpractice, and holding that the plaintiffs failed to
show that the applicable standard of care was breached. 3
Although the federal regulations do not provide a specific standard of
care for researcher malpractice, obtaining IRB approval should only be a
partial defense. IRB approval demonstrates that an independent group of
IRB members with professional competence determined, inter alia, that
the research had scientific merit, the benefits outweighed the risks, and
the informed consent form was in compliance with federal
249. Id. § 46.111 (a)(2); see supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
250. Id. § 46.11 l(a)(1) (stating IRBs must determine that research protocols use "procedures
which are consistent with sound research design").
251. See FURROW, supra note 70, at 269.
252. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 198-203 and accompanying text.
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requirements 4.2 " Although the Heinrich court observed that "the bar to be
surmounted in litigation over current charges of [researcher] malpractice
is a demanding one, ''255 the circuit court found that approval by
committees similar to IRBs was a partial defense. 6 If the researcher
complied with the federal regulations and obtained IRB approval, it
should at least be evidence of meeting the standard of care for researcher
malpractice.
There are several reasons why IRB approval should only create a
rebuttable presumption of due care in research malpractice actions, rather
than serving as a complete defense. First, complying with the federal
requirement of obtaining IRB approval will not necessarily prevent a
finding of researcher malpractice if a reasonable person would have
taken additional precautions. 7 Second, the federal regulations explicitly
allow higher standards of care set by federal, state, or local laws.258
Consequently, courts must evaluate whether other laws set higher
standards of care than those required to obtain IRB approval. Third, ERB
approval itself may be flawed if the researcher provided inaccurate
information about the risks and benefits of the research, or failed to
provide information about adverse events for annual continuing
review.25 9 The IRB relies on the researcher's training and honesty when
reviewing and approving research protocols. It is always possible that
this reliance could be misplaced.
Further, the ERB itself may not have adequately performed the ERB
review. For instance, the Grimes court criticized the IRB's performance
in approving the research, and allowed a negligence action against
researchers to proceed because the IRB approval was flawed.260 Finally,
even if the researcher obtained proper ERB approval before conducting
the research, it is possible that the research was negligently performed, 26 '
or that the researcher deviated from the IRB-approved protocol. Juries
should therefore consider ERB approval as evidence that the standard of
254. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
255. Heinrich v. Sweet, 308 F.3d 48, 71 (1st Cir. 2002).
256. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
257. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288c (1965).
258. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(f) (2001).
259. Id. § 46.109(e); see note 49 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
261. See John Robertson, The Law ofInstitutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REv. 484, 531
(1978).
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care for researcher malpractice was met, but should ultimately assess the
value of that evidence in the context of expert testimony.
Thus, courts should adopt the federal regulations as the standard of
care for informed consent in human subject research, using expert
testimony to establish whether the standard of care for informed consent
was breached. Researchers who violate the federal requirements for
informed consent should be held liable, although researchers who
comply with these requirements should be granted a partial defense.
Because the federal regulations do not provide detailed standards of care
for researchers conducting research, plaintiffs should be able to establish
the standard of care in researcher malpractice through expert testimony.
Researchers who proceed without IRB approval should be held liable,
while researchers who obtain IRB approval should only be entitled to a
partial defense.
CONCLUSION
Injured human subjects are becoming more likely to sue researchers.
Although the case law on human subject research is just beginning to
emerge, plaintiffs should be able to successfully establish negligence
claims against researchers by establishing a duty of care based on the
special relationship between researchers and subjects. Having established
that researchers owe human subjects a duty of care, injured research
subjects should be able to bring negligence actions against researchers
based on informed consent and researcher malpractice. Research subjects
should be able to establish the federal regulations as the minimum
standard of care in informed consent, and use expert witnesses to
determine whether the federal requirements for informed consent were
violated. Violating the standard of care for informed consent in the
federal regulations should result in a finding of negligence, and
researchers who comply with the regulations should be allowed a partial
defense. Although the federal regulations do not provide a specific
standard of care for researcher malpractice, research subjects should be
able to establish specialized standards of care for researcher malpractice
through expert testimony, similar to the traditional medical malpractice
model. Failure to obtain IRB approval should result in a finding of
negligence, and IRB approval should only be a partial defense.
264
